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TAXONOMIES OF SQUATTING: UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION IN A NEW 
LEGAL ORDER 
 
Lorna Fox O’Mahony and Neil Cobb  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The erosion of traditional principles of adverse possession in the Land Registration 
Act 2002, together with the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Pye v The United Kingdom
1
 - articulating important claims about 
the legitimacy of title acquisition by adverse possession in the context of Article 1 of 
the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights – have embedded a 
new legal order for the regulation of title by adverse possession, underpinned by a set 
of taken-for-granted moral perspectives which reflect a wholly negative view of the 
activity of squatting.
2
  These changes have taken place against a backdrop of rising 
moral outrage towards squatters who secure title to land in this way.
3
  Furthermore, 
while academic analyses in the US continue to consider the justifications for adverse 
possession,
4
 and the traditional doctrine of adverse possession continues to subsist 
across a range of ECHR jurisdictions, as well as in many Torrens-style land 
registration systems,
5
 property law scholars in England and Wales have indicated that, 
in the context of the prevailing approach to title registration: „…it has come to seem 
increasingly strange that adverse possession should have any relevance in a regime 
                                                 

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1
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2
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the Land Registration Act 2002‟ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236. 
3
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4
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5
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where the formal registration of title is supposed to provide a definitive record of 
estate ownership.‟6   
 
The courts, in a similar vein, have described the (pre-2002) operation of adverse 
possession as „apparently unjust‟,7 with Neuberger J recently observing that it was: 
„…hard to see what principle of justice entitles the trespasser to acquire the land for 
nothing from the owner simply because he has been permitted to remain there for 12 
years.‟; a conclusion which „…does not accord with justice, and cannot be justified by 
practical considerations [is] draconian to the owner and a windfall for the squatter‟.8  
Furthermore, the Law Commission‟s re-designation of adverse possession as „theft of 
land‟,9 as part of its work on land registration, has copper-fastened the portrayal of the 
squatter‟s actions as wrong (tantamount to criminal activity), with the dispossessed 
landowner as the „victim‟ of the piece.     
 
This article re-considers the way in which the moral responsibility of both squatter 
and landowner has been cast in this new legal order.  The prevailing approach to 
adverse possession in England and Wales presents a simplified, „black-and-white‟ 
picture of unlawful occupation, which essentialises the landowner as „in the right‟ and 
the squatter as acting wrongfully.  In this article, we argue instead that the activity of 
unlawful occupation raises a series of complex questions relating to both the use of 
land and the regulation of title, which can usefully be considered by unpacking the 
variety of socio-legal constructions of squatter and landowner, and by considering the 
activity of unlawful occupation in relation to use of land as well as (registered) title.  
In doing so, we have found it helpful to consider the legal construction of the squatter 
and the landowner through a range of legal lenses: crime; housing; limitation; 
property; and human rights; as there is some difference of approach across these 
contexts, for example, as to whether the primary concern of the legal response is with 
the act (or consequences) of squatting itself, the acquisition of title through adverse 
possession, or a combination.  The purpose of this analysis is to develop a „taxonomy 
of squatting‟ with which one might better evaluate the law in this area.  
                                                 
6
 K. Gray & S. F. Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4
th
 Edn, 2004), para 
6.50.  
7
 J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2002] UKHL 30, [2], per Lord Bingham. 
8
 J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2000] Ch 676, 709-710. 
9
 Law Commission, Land Registration for the 21st Century: A Conveyancing Revolution (Law Com No 
271), (London: HMSO, 2001), para 10.5. 
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The idea of pursuing legal scholarship though the development of taxonomies is not 
without its critics, both within and beyond the UK legal academy.
10
  In the context of 
English property law, the activity of classification has become strongly associated 
with the Birksian taxonomy of private law,
11
 which, briefly stated, sought to identify a 
series of discrete categories into which legal rights, obligations, claims and outcomes 
would be „mapped‟, to evaluate the „rightness‟ of a decision by its ability to fit into 
the appropriate category, and to use the resulting taxonomy to direct the future 
development of the law along certain rational, clearly identified channels.  This article 
does not purport to contribute to this project: as the „keepers of the squatting 
taxonomy‟12 it is not our goal to set out a „rational taxonomy‟ of legal responses to 
squatting, or of adverse possession, but rather to set out a „formal taxonomy‟ through 
which we can better understand the complex and significant twists and turns which 
the law has taken in this field in recent years.   
 
The purposes of such a „formal taxonomy‟ were usefully explored in a recent paper, 
in which Emily Sherwin analysed the role and function of legal taxonomies.
13
  
Sherwin considered two competing models of legal taxonomy: (1) the „reason based 
taxonomy‟ applied by Professor Birks, whereby legal rules and decisions are 
classified according to „legal principles‟, and the resulting taxonomy is employed to 
determine future decision making, and (2) the „formal taxonomy‟, a process by which 
efforts are made to classify legal materials according to rules of order and clarity.  
Sherwin noted that while a reason-based taxonomy seeks to identify „high-level 
decisional rules‟, formal taxonomy „serves less ambitious objectives, such as 
facilitating legal analysis and communication‟.14  For formal taxonomy, the key 
objective of mapping legal provisions, principles or decisions was articulated by 
                                                 
10
 See, for example, D. Campbell, „Classification and the Crisis of the Common Law‟ (1999) 26 JLS 
369; P. Jaffey, „Classification and Unjust Enrichment‟ (2004) 67 MLR 1012; G. Samuel, „English 
Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomical Debate‟ (2004) 24 OJLS 335. 
11
 See, for example, P. Birks, English Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), vol. 1, pp. 
xxxv-xliii; P. Birks, „Definition and Division, A Meditation on Institutes 3.13‟, in P. Birks (ed) The 
Classification of Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P Birks, „Equity in the Modern 
Law‟ (1996) 26 Western Australian Law Review 1.   
12
 Birks refers to „the keeper of the trusts taxonomy‟, for example, in section IV.D of his lecture 
„Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment‟, published at (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law 
Review 1. 
13
 E. Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 47, 
2006), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925129 (last visited 12 June 2008). 
14
 ibid Abstract. 
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Sherwin as based in a recognition that: „[c]lassification plays a necessary role in legal 
analysis: to think and argue clearly about law, we need to organize the raw material of 
legal rules and decisions into more general categories.  Yet, surely these general 
categories should correspond to the reasons that under lie the law. Only then will they 
be of practical use as guides to legal decision-making.‟15  
 
This paper begins the construction of a formal taxonomy of legal responses to 
unauthorised occupation in England and Wales.  We believe it is a timely exercise 
given recent developments in both legislative and judicial policies in the UK which 
have dramatically altered legal responses to squatting and, particularly, to adverse 
possession.  On the one hand, the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002) set out a 
new legal framework for the regulation of title in registered land which has effectively 
curtailed the operation of adverse possession in favour of squatters,
16
 described by 
one commentator as „the emasculation of adverse possession in relation to registered 
land.‟17  Perhaps most interestingly, this „Velvet Revolution‟ was achieved with no 
effective opposition either within the property law community, or in any wider public 
forum.   
 
In a recent article,
18
 the present authors analysed the impact of the LRA 2002 on the 
doctrine of adverse possession in registered land.  This article argued that the reforms 
set out in that Act, while presented as a practical response to the incongruities 
between „title by registration‟ and acquisition of title by squatters, also implemented a 
contentious moral agenda in relation to advertent squatters and to absent landowners.  
Furthermore, it was noted that while these provisions will have important practical 
and philosophical consequences, the Law Commission has attempted to close off any 
prospect of further debate on the subject, without explicit consideration of important 
contextual matters, for example, the contemporary social and housing issues 
associated with urban squatting, or the matrix of moral issues at stake in such cases.  
Yet, the implicit emergence of a moral agenda in relation to adverse possession in 
English law raises important issues relating to the essentialisation of the squatter as a 
                                                 
15
 Above n 13, 4, emphasis added. 
16
 See, for example, M. Dixon, „The Reform of Property Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A 
Risk Assessment‟ [2003] Conv 136; M. Dixon, „Adverse Possession and Human Rights‟ [2005] Conv 
345, 351; M. Dixon, „Adverse Possession in Three Jurisdictions‟ [2006] Conv 179. 
17
 ibid Dixon (2003), 150. 
18
 Above n 2. 
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wrong-doer.  Having established the role of the moral agenda in the LRA 2002, in this 
article we seek to begin the process of delineating the moral content of legal 
frameworks regulating unlawful occupation, in a „taxonomy of squatting‟.   
 
This project is important, not only as a means of analysing the provisions of the LRA 
2002 relating to adverse possession, but also as a tool for mapping the judicial role in 
the constructions of squatter and landowner in cases of unlawful occupation.  In the 
recent Pye litigation, both the English courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights have appraised the doctrine under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention of Human Rights.  These developments have played a 
significant role in the re-construction of legal responses towards the activity of 
squatting, and the acquisition of title by adverse possession.  However, the obvious 
contestation between various judges in these cases, exemplified by the Grand 
Chamber‟s rejection of the earlier European Court of Human Rights judgment, 
indicates a debate that has clearly not been resolved at the highest levels. 
 
In identifying a series of squatting taxonomies, this paper views the activity of 
squatting broadly, and focuses on legal responses to both the use of property and the 
acquisition of title through adverse possession.  The object of the exercise is not to 
attempt to fit the law into a rational scheme,
19
 as a „reason-based taxonomy‟ would 
require, but rather to pursue what Sherwin describes as a „formal taxonomy‟, that is, 
by mapping the range of legal materials which deal with squatting issues in order to 
better understand „the purposes and principles that animate legal decision making.‟20  
For this reason, the discussion focuses on the discursive tropes that underlie the 
various responses to unlawful occupation in contemporary English law.  This analysis 
is necessary, in part, because these responses are scattered across legal topics, both 
public law and private law.  Nevertheless, several common themes can usefully be 
mapped across these contexts.  These themes include questions of fault on the part of 
both the squatter and the dispossessed landowner, and the hardship likely to be 
occasioned upon each party in the event of alternative legal outcomes.  
 
                                                 
19
 See Sherwin, above n 13, p2, describing the English taxonomical debate in the context of restitution 
and unjust enrichment.   
20
 ibid p4. 
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Legal responses to unlawful occupation, broadly defined, can be categorised across 
these fields of legal regulation, by focusing on four central factors which we have 
identified as significant in English law.  The first of these is the identity of squatters 
as they have been constructed within legal discourses in the UK: the legal 
construction of squatters in English law presents particularly interesting scope for 
analysis in light of the strength of the negative social construction of unlawful 
occupation, evidenced not least by media portrayals of squatters, whether in relation 
to their use of land, or the acquisition of title through adverse possession.
21
  The 
second factor relates to the type of property subjected to unlawful occupation, which 
can range from empty residential (publicly or privately owned) property to 
commercial property, urban or rural property, and, of course, also including what are 
often very small amounts of property in the context of boundary disputes.  The third 
factor is the squatter‟s motivation for committing the trespass – and law‟s response to 
this: whether the trespass is committed under a mistake, as may be the case in a 
boundary dispute; with a view to deliberate acquisition of title; or with the intention to 
use the land for the time being, perhaps because the squatter has nowhere else to live.  
The fourth and final factor is the legal response, across the range of principles and 
policies considered in this paper, to the conduct of the landowner: that is, whether the 
landowner is regarded as blameworthy or at fault.   
 
By organising our discussion around these four variables, we hope to identify 
coherent patterns in the law – a „formal taxonomy‟ - with a view to enhancing legal 
analyses and evaluations of recent and significant shifts in the law and policy of 
adverse possession.  Once again, these taxonomies are not intended to identify legal 
principles which would act as a constraint on future legal decision making; rather the 
object is to shed light upon the moral principles that we believe to be implicit in both 
legislative and judicial policy.  In the following sections, we seek to organise the 
diverse legal materials relating to squatting and adverse possession across the ambit of 
English law as they can be positioned against the matrices of fault and hardship.  We 
then proceed to consider how this taxonomy can help us contextualise recent judicial 
                                                 
21
 See, Cobb and Fox, above n 2, footnote 4 and associated text; see also K. Green, „Citizens and 
Squatters: Under the Surfaces of Land Law‟ in S. Bright and J. Dewar (eds), Land Law: Themes and 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
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pronouncements in the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights, in 
the context of the Pye litigation. 
 
LEGAL RESPONSES TO UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION 
 
The provisions by which the activities of squatters are regulated in law are scattered 
across a wide range of legal contexts.  This section focuses on the ways in which this 
multiplicity of contexts obscures a range of underlying attitudes towards the activity 
of squatting and towards the morality of both the squatter and the dispossessed 
landowner.  This focus on morality reflects the central, but implicit, role that moral 
perspectives – whether in relation to the squatter‟s unlawful occupation or the 
landowner‟s fault or neglect in failing to effectively supervise the land - have had on 
recent developments in the law of adverse possession.  This section begins by 
mapping the law regulating unlawful occupation as it has developed in the context of 
criminal law, housing, and property law.  The following section will then consider the 
impact of human rights discourse, as manifested through the Pye litigation, in 
transplanting constructions of the squatter and the dispossessed occupier in English 
law, into a broader international forum.   
 
Although this paper embarks on the process of classifying law‟s approach to unlawful 
occupation by focusing on morality, it is important to emphasise that this is only one 
aspect of what we see as a wider „meta-map‟ of legal regulation in this context.  As 
Figure 1 indicates, across the spectrum of English law, legal discourse has emphasised 
a range of competing (and overlapping) perspectives on unlawful occupation: the 
need to act in the interests of economic efficiency, to respond to the problem of 
housing need, to treat squatters as a „social problem‟ to be addressed through law and 
policy, or to focus on the (im)morality of unlawful occupation.  It is also useful to 
bear in mind that, across these contexts, the objective of regulation varies: so, for 
example, while both the criminal law and housing are concerned with the activity of 
squatting as it impacts on the use of land, property law is primarily concerned with the 
consequences of squatting in relation to the acquisition of title through adverse 
possession. 
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  Economic 
efficiency 
Housing 
need 
Squatters 
constructed as 
a social 
problem? 
Morality What is at 
stake: Title or 
Use? 
Criminal  NO 
 
NO YES YES 
(role of 
moral 
perspective 
for criminal 
law)  
USE 
Housing  YES 
(need to 
effectively 
utilise housing 
stock) 
YES 
(only 
housing 
policy is 
concerned 
with 
housing 
need) 
YES YES  
(immorality 
of jumping 
the queue)  
USE 
Property 
(limitation) 
YES (resonates 
with values of 
property law) 
NO  NO (principle 
of limitation 
ostensibly 
neutral to 
squatter as 
social problem)  
NO 
(ostensibly 
neutral to 
moral 
question) 
TITLE 
Property 
(registered 
land after 
LRA 2002) 
YES (resonates 
with values of 
property law 
especially in 
registered land) 
NO  YES YES 
(re-
emergence 
of moral 
agenda in 
reforms of 
LRA 2002) 
TITLE 
Figure 1 - The ‘meta-map’ of legal responses to squatting in English law  
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The primary role of the meta-map is to highlight the ways in which legal discourses 
concerning squatting are moulded by the values and priorities of different branches of 
the legal system.  For instance, the criminal law approach to squatting has developed 
to reflect a continued moral panic around the „urban squatter‟.  In contrast to this, the 
housing perspective places considerably more emphasis on the importance of 
economic efficiency in the use of land, particularly residential property, and the need 
to ensure that property is effectively utilised to serve housing needs.  We also 
consider the impact of the LRA 2002 by identifying the way in which the shift in 
property law‟s approaches to squatting has reflected both the construction of squatters 
as a social problem and the emergence of a new morality agenda in relation to adverse 
possession.   
 
A. Criminal Law 
 
Despite the popular perception of squatting as a criminal activity, often criticised as 
being tantamount to „land theft‟, squatting, per se, is not a criminal offence in English 
law.  Although squatters commit the tort of trespass, this usually constitutes a civil 
and not a criminal trespass, remediable by the landowner bringing a private action 
against the squatter in the form of a claim for the recovery of land.
22
  Indeed, when a 
group of squatters took up residence in a former police station at Arbour Square in 
East London in 2004, Scotland Yard spent several months attempting to recover 
possession of the property in order to sell the land to a developer.
23
  While the 
squatters flew a skull-and-cross-bones flag at half-mast over the building, the police 
were powerless to use force against the unlawful occupiers.  Once squatters have 
effectively taken possession of property as their home, it is an offence to: „use or 
                                                 
22
 Under Pt 55 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132.  See also Sch 1, Ord 24 and Ord 113.  
This procedure can be „fast-tracked‟, particularly if use is made of an interim possession order, 
allowing a hearing within three days of the application.  The squatter is guilty of a criminal offence if 
he fails to leave on being served with an interim possession order, returns to the property to which the 
order applies within 12 months, or knowingly or recklessly gives false information in order to obtain or 
resist such an order; Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, ss 75 and 76.  Although the new 
criminal offence of „aggravated trespass‟ was created in 1994, it applies only in limited circumstances,  
when a person trespasses on land, when a lawful activity is taking place on that land or land nearby, 
and the trespasser does anything to intimidate, obstruct or disrupt that activity; Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994, s 68.  This provision is often used in response to large scale trespasses, for 
example, travellers in unauthorised encampments or protesters, and raises many further issues for the 
squatting taxonomy of which limits of space prohibit exploration in this article.   
23
 S. O‟Neill & N. Woolcock, „Squatters find police station is good home without any charges‟, The 
Times 17 January 2005; available online at  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article413446.ece (last visited 12 June 2008).  
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threaten violence to secure entry to any premises when it is known that there is 
someone present on the premises who is opposed to the entry‟;24 which means that 
unless the squatter voluntarily yields up possession, the landowner must obtain a court 
order before it will be possible to recover the land.   
 
The only circumstance in which squatting has been criminalised in English law (as a 
criminal trespass), and where the police have enhanced powers to act, is when 
squatters displace the occupiers of residential properties.
25
  These provisions do not 
apply to non-residential, or empty residential properties, where the control of 
squatting is left to the civil law.  The criminalisation of squatting in only these limited 
circumstances bears some useful analysis in relation to the four key factors identified 
in the introduction to this paper.  Furthermore, as figure 2 demonstrates, this analysis 
can in turn be mapped in terms of the „fault‟ of each party – the squatter and the 
landowner – and the „hardship‟ each will suffer, depending on the nature and extent of 
legal intervention.   
 
Firstly, in relation to the identity of the squatter, criminal law regulates squatting only 
when the squatter displaces an occupier from the home which they currently occupy.  
The criminal law‟s focus, then, is firmly upon a particular type of squatter: the „urban 
squatter‟, who squats deliberately, and predominantly in empty residential housing 
stock.  Thus, as criminal law responds to concerns about law and order, from drug 
dealing to arson, dereliction, vandalism, and litter – what Wates and Wolmar 
described as the: „…popular mythology…that all squatters are parasitic deviants who 
steal people‟s houses and constitute a threat to everything decent in society.‟;26 - it is 
perhaps not surprising to find, within the criminal law, an emphasis upon the 
immorality of squatting and on this type of squatter as a social problem.  This 
approach is also reflected in a report published by the Home Office in 1991, which 
stated that:  
  
                                                 
24
 Criminal Law Act 1977, section 6. 
25
 See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ss 72-76, amending the Criminal Law Act 1977.  
For this purpose, the 1977 Act designates two types of displaced occupier: the displaced residential 
occupier and the protected intending occupier.  It is a criminal offence for a squatter to fail to leave 
premises when either of these individuals demands that they do: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994, s 73, modifying Criminal Law Act 1977, s 7. 
26
 N. Wates and C. Wolmar (eds), Squatting: The Real Story (London: Bay Leaf Books, 1980), 3. 
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[t]here are no valid arguments in defence of squatting.  It represents the 
seizure of another‟s property without consent…The Government does not 
accept the claim that is sometimes made that squatting is a reasonable recourse 
of the homeless resulting from social deprivation.  Squatters are generally 
there by their own choice, moved by no more than self gratification or an 
unreadiness to respect other people‟s rights.27  
 
In these circumstances, it is clear that fault is firmly fixed upon the squatter, 
especially vis-à-vis a landowner who is, at the time, in occupation of the property.   
 
The type of property to which this provision applies is also significant: only occupied 
residential property – that is, property which is currently in use as a home – is 
protected in this way by the criminal law.  Displacement from one‟s home, distinct 
from displacement from any other type of property - is likely to cause particularly 
serious hardship to the landowner.
28
  Yet, when considering the squatter‟s motivation 
for trespass (and despite the arguments that might potentially be made in this context 
relating to homeless squatters), hardship for the squatter is not regarded as a relevant 
factor by the criminal law.  Although squatters who target residential property often 
do so because they wish to use the property for accommodation, in some cases 
because they are homeless, to do so at the expense of someone else‟s home is, for 
English law, the trigger for criminalisation.  Finally, we note that a landowner who is 
directly displaced from current occupation of the property cannot be regarded as being 
at fault since he or she has not been careless, has not neglected or abandoned the 
property, but was making appropriate use of the property as a home at the time of the 
dispossession.       
 
CRIMINAL LAW Fault Hardship 
Squatter Squatter at fault for forced 
dispossession of occupied 
property 
Not relevant 
                                                 
27
 Home Office, Squatting: a Home Office consultation paper (London: HMSO, 1991), paras 5, 62. 
28
 See L. Fox, Conceptualising Home: Theories, Laws and Policies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), 
particularly chapter 3 which discusses the impact of dispossession and displacement from an occupied 
home.  Of course, the impact of these powers is debatable, since it seems highly unlikely that an urban 
squatter would target occupied housing. 
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Landowner Dispossessed landowner in 
occupation, not neglectful, 
so not at fault 
Loss of an occupied home 
would constitute severe 
hardship 
Figure 2 - The Criminalisation of Squatting: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
 
B. The Housing Context 
 
One of the principal tensions in relation to unlawful occupation in the housing context 
is between the use of property by squatters, the non-use of empty homes by 
landowners, and the implications of both for the housing allocation process.  The 
problem of „empty homes‟ has been identified as a key political issue, particularly in 
light of rising house prices and indications that there are currently around 78,000 
families living in temporary accommodation in England and Wales;
29
 that 3.8 million 
new households are estimated to be in need of accommodation by 2016;
30
 and that 
properties currently lying empty could potentially offer around 600,000 new homes, 
almost 100,000 of these in London alone, where the housing market is most 
saturated.
31
  These market conditions provide an attractive environment for „urban 
squatters‟, that is, squatters who unlawfully occupy empty (usually residential) 
property for use as accommodation.
32
  Against the backdrop of the empty homes 
debate, it might be considered that the hardship associated with (risk of) homelessness 
provides a degree of moral justification for urban squatting.  Yet it is clear that, for 
English law, when a person squats because of homelessness (or, as was often the case 
in London in the 1960s and 1970s, for political reasons relating to housing 
management), from a housing perspective, as from a criminal law perspective, he or 
she is regarded both as a social problem and as personally blameworthy.   
 
However, the reasoning behind this allocation of fault differs fundamentally in the 
housing context, compared to that which emerged in the context of crime control.  
Firstly, while urban squatting has been linked, historically, to protest at the perceived 
                                                 
29
 See More than a Roof: A Report into Tackling Homelessness (London: ODPM, 2002). 
30
 Housing Statistics: Projections of Households in England 2021 (London: DETR, 1999). 
31
 Information provided by local authorities to the Department for Transport, Local Government and 
the Regions (DTLR) on Housing Investment Programme returns; see the website available at 
http://www.emptyhomes.com (last visited 12 June 2008). 
32
 See Cobb & Fox, above n 2, text accompanying nn 65-76. 
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injustices of local authority housing allocation procedures,
33
 housing policy inevitably 
favours a principled, bureaucratic system of housing allocation, which can take 
account of factors such as need or welfare interests, over the „who dares wins‟ of 
urban squatting.
34
  Furthermore, urban squatting of empty homes has been identified 
as a barrier to bringing these vacant properties back into official „use‟.35  The 
presence of squatters is said to render the „emptiness‟ of the property less evident to 
the local authorities which are now charged with a clearly defined duty to maintain 
and enhance the health of the housing market, including identification of empty 
properties, across a range of tenures.
36
  In particular, local authorities owe a statutory 
enforcement duty to impose Empty Dwelling Management Orders where owners 
either cannot be identified or are unwilling to bring the property back into use.
37
  
Finally, the construction of urban squatting within housing policy as a serious social 
problem is tied to concerns about the impact of squatters on neighbourhoods, as a 
reflection of the historic connection between urban squatting and neighbourhood 
„anti-social behaviour‟.38 
 
Yet, the Empty Homes agenda also appears to confer a degree of responsibility upon 
landowners for their failure to ensure the use of their vacant properties.  Government 
literature in this area alludes to the problem of wasting resources and specifically 
housing.  In 2006, the Department of Communities and Local Government stated that: 
„[w]e recognise that each empty property is a wasted resource from the point of view 
of the owner, a wasted opportunity from the point of view of a developer and a wasted 
asset from the point of view of Local Authorities charged with bringing forward 
sufficient land and housing to meet projected housing needs.‟39  The emphasis on 
                                                 
33
 D. Cant, Squatting and Private Property Rights (London: UCL, 1978).  See Cobb & Fox, above n 2, 
text accompanying nn 46-49. 
34
 The attitude of the English courts has been clear and consistent since the decision in Southwark 
London Borough Council v Williams [1971] 1 Ch 734, when the Court of Appeal famously held that 
necessity was no defence to trespass by homeless people who were squatting in empty council houses 
during a severe London housing shortage in the 1970s.  The availability of a system of public housing 
was used by Lord Denning to strengthen his argument. 
35
 See Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Empty Property: Unlocking the Potential: An 
Implementation Handbook, (London: HMSO, 2006), section A1.2, 19. 
36
 These duties are set out in the Local Government Act 1999 and the Housing Renewal Regulatory 
Reform Order 2001. 
37
 See Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Empty Dwelling Management Orders: Consultation on 
Secondary Legislation (London: HMSO, 2005). 
38
 See above, text accompanying n 18. 
39
 DCLG, Empty Property: Unlocking the Potential - A Case for Action (London: HMSO, 2006), 
Ministerial Forward, 5. 
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wastefulness can be read as implying that landowners who leave their property empty 
have failed in some broader duty towards society as a whole, by squandering the 
valuable contribution that the housing resource holds for the well-being of 
communities, as a resource for use, for economic regeneration, and (in part, by 
preventing the growth of squatting) for neighbourhoods.  The website for the 
Department for Communities and Local Government clearly sets out that 
department‟s concerns with empty properties, which is worth quoting at length: 
 
Anyone who is unfortunate enough to have lived next door to a property that 
has been left empty for a long period of time will understand the sheer 
frustration and misery such a situation can create.  Poorly maintained empty 
properties are not only unsightly and unattractive, they seriously reduce the 
value of adjoining properties. 
As the government department responsible for shaping housing policy in 
England, how the existing housing stock is used falls squarely within 
Communities and Local Government‟s remit.  It is important to maximise use 
of the existing housing stock so that we can minimise the number of new 
homes that need to be built each year, particularly in areas of the country 
where housing demand is high, such as the south east of England. 
Empty homes not only restrict housing supply, they also detract from the 
quality of the local environment and can cause significant problems for local 
residents.  Poorly maintained empty homes attract vermin, cause damp and 
other problems for neighbouring properties and are magnets for vandals, 
squatters, drug dealers and arsonists.
40
 
 
From this perspective, landowners who allow their properties to lie empty are 
constructed less as „victims‟ who experience hardship at the hands of squatters, than 
as acting „at fault‟ vis-à-vis neighbouring occupiers, owners, the neighbourhood, and 
society at large (through the correlation made between empty properties and anti-
social behaviour), and, crucially, as failing to make effective use of the housing 
resource.  The development of the Government‟s „Empty Homes‟ agenda has 
                                                 
40
 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingmanagementcare/emptyhomes/frequentlyaskedquesti
ons/, (last visited 12 June 2008).   
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important implications for the proposition that landowners who leave their property 
lying empty and unsupervised are morally blameworthy.  This allocation of fault to 
the landowner will be contrasted with the idea of the „blameless landowner‟, who 
cannot be expected to identify and remove squatters from his or her premises, in the 
context of the reform of adverse possession in registered land, considered in section 
D, below.  
 
HOUSING Fault Hardship 
Squatter Squatter at fault for 
avoiding allocation 
process and for damaging 
communities 
Some hardship but 
addressed through 
allocation process 
Landowner Landowner at fault for 
leaving property vacant   
Little hardship as property 
is not in use 
Figure 3 – Housing: the ‘empty homes’ agenda 
 
C. Adverse possession and the traditional principles of limitation    
 
The doctrine of adverse possession is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 
legal regulation of squatting, because it ultimately relates to a squatter not merely 
using, but securing legal title to a landowner‟s property.  The operation of the doctrine 
of adverse possession formed the basis of the Pye litigation, which is considered in 
detail in later sections of this article.  In theory, the traditional doctrinal approach to 
adverse possession under the Limitation Act 1980
41
 was ostensibly neutral to the 
social contexts considered in this paper, and to the themes of fault and hardship: once 
the necessary criteria were in place – that the true owner was out of possession, the 
squatter was in possession and that the possession was „adverse‟ – the „clock‟ would 
start against the landowner.  If the squatter remained in adverse possession of the land 
for a period of twelve years, a combination of the limitation principle (whereby the 
landowner‟s right of action to recover the land was usually extinguished),42 and the 
doctrine of relativity of title, meant that the squatter acquired an effective status of 
„irremovability‟ against both the landowner and (by relativity of title) any other 
                                                 
41
 Which still applies to unregistered land in England and Wales. 
42
 Limitation Act 1980, s 15. 
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parties seeking to establish possession.  Furthermore, these principles applied across 
the full range of circumstances in which unlawful occupation of land took place: 
factors such as the identity of the squatter, the nature of the property, the squatter‟s 
motivation for trespass and the conduct of the landowner were ostensibly irrelevant.   
 
Yet, while this „one size fits all‟ approach to adverse possession by limitation did not 
appear to distinguish between different circumstances of squatting, it is clear that the 
doctrinal definitions of „possession‟, „intention to possess‟ and „adverse‟ did give the 
courts some scope to respond to the context of the unlawful occupation.  In fact, we 
would agree that „judicial reluctance to assist squatters has manifested itself in a 
number of different ways.‟43  For example, when considering whether the squatter has 
established factual possession of the property, English courts are typically reluctant to 
find the true owner to be out of possession if there is any evidence that he or she is 
still in control of land.
44
  The presumption of lawful possession means that the 
slightest acts of control by the landowner will generally suffice to indicate that he or 
she is still in possession of the property.
45
   
 
Similarly, restrictions on the potential for successful claims of adverse possession 
have developed through the requirement that the squatter‟s possession must be 
adverse.  The „implied licence‟ theory, applied in a series of cases from the late 
nineteenth century,
46
 was based on the proposition that, in order to be „adverse‟, the 
squatter‟s possession must be inconsistent with the landowner‟s future plans for the 
use of the land – otherwise, the landowner was deemed to have granted an implied 
licence to the squatter, so rendering his or her possession to be by permission rather 
than adverse.  This seems to support a construction of the landowner as tending to 
leave land unused for good economic reasons, for example because of future plans for 
development: thus, the landowner is not at fault for leaving the land unused for the 
time being, making the loss of title to the land (and the opportunity to carry out the 
future plans) a disproportionate hardship.  The „implied licence‟ theory was 
                                                 
43
 O. Rhys, „Adverse Possession, Human Rights and Judicial Heresy‟ [2002] Conv 470, 471. 
44
 See, for example, Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452, 470; JA Pye (Oxford) v Graham 
[2003] 1 AC 419, [70], per Lord Hope.  
45
 Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P&CR 452 at 472, per Slade LJ; Lambeth LBC v Blackburn (2001) 
82 P&CR 494, [19], per Clarke LJ. 
46
 Leigh v Jack (1879) 5 Ex. D 264; Wallis’s Holiday Camp v Shell-Max [1975] 1 QB 94 (CA); see 
Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P&CR 452 for criticism of this principle. 
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significantly restricted in the Limitation Act 1980,
47
 and the English courts initially 
responded by co-operating in the curtailment of the doctrine.
48
  The High Court‟s 
recent attempt to revive this doctrine in Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer
49
 can, 
however, be viewed as in accordance with the current trend towards a greater role for 
fault- and hardship-oriented policies in English adverse possession law.  
 
Yet, in a number of other ways there appears to be evidence that courts have 
supported the squatter vis-à-vis the landowner.  Specifically, it seems to be the case 
that the idea of a „duty of stewardship‟ through effective scrutiny of one‟s land carried 
some weight in the pre-2003 system of adverse possession.  For instance, in Purbrick 
v Hackney London Borough Council,
50
 Neuberger J concluded that „it is to some 
extent implicit in the present law of adverse possession, that an owner of property 
who makes no use of it, whatever, should be expected to keep an eye on the property 
to ensure that adverse possession rights are not being clocked up.  A period of 12 
years is a long period during which to neglect a property completely.‟51  Where the 
landowner has made no effort to control the land, it is easier both to view the 
landowner as bearing some blame for the loss of the land, and to consider the burden 
of hardship relatively lighter than it would be were the landowner still at least 
attempting to secure his possession.  Reciprocally, this could also be regarded as 
giving the squatter in this context – who may be viewed as less blameworthy since he 
or she is making use of land over which the owner has failed to exercise control – a 
morally stronger claim to eventual title.
52
   
 
One variable that could have enabled the courts to pursue a more explicitly moral 
approach to adverse possession is the distinction between “good faith” and “bad faith” 
adverse possession.  The good faith/bad faith distinction is employed in many 
                                                 
47
 Limitation Act 1980, Sched 1, para 8(4), which provides that there shall not be an implied licence 
due solely to the fact that occupation is not inconsistent with the future use of the property. 
48
 See, for example, Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623; JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v 
Graham [2002] 3 All ER 865. 
49
 [2005] EWHC 1460; the decision in Beaulane was also rooted in the response of the English court 
towards the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998, discussed further below. 
50
 [2003] EWHC 1871. 
51
 ibid, [25]. 
52
 See, for example, JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2000] Ch 676, 705G-H, per Neuberger J.   
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jurisdictions
53
 to distinguish between squatters who are deemed to bear fault in 
relation to the unlawful occupation because of their deliberate intrusion upon 
another‟s property (bad faith trespassers), and those who are innocent of any 
wrongdoing because they are unaware that they have trespassed (good faith 
trespassers).  English courts have never explicitly departed from the position that, for 
the purposes of animus possidendi in English law, the distinction between innocent 
and wilful trespass is irrelevant, thus maintaining the position that, in the context of 
unregistered land, the degree of fault attributed to the squatter is not a factor to be 
taken into account in determining title.
54
  Yet, as section D will indicate, the absence 
of the „fault‟ trope within the context of limitation has, with the enactment of the LRA 
2002, been effectively superseded by a considerably more fault-oriented approach to 
adverse possession in registered land.    
 
D. Adverse possession and the Land Registration Act 2002 
 
To the extent that property law was ostensibly neutral to the moral questions of fault 
and hardship in unlawful occupation, everything changed with the „new legal order‟ 
ushered in with the enactment of the Land Registration Act 2002 („LRA 2002‟).  The 
mechanics of the LRA 2002 so far as adverse possession is concerned can be briefly 
stated: in order for a squatter to obtain title to registered land, the squatter may, after 
being in adverse possession for ten years, apply to the Land Registry to be registered 
as proprietor.
55
  Crucially, however, the squatter has no entitlement to be registered at 
this stage.  The Land Registry must then respond by sending a notice to the registered 
proprietor (and others with registered interests in the land), informing them that an 
application has been made by the squatter.
56
  Recipients of such a notice are given 65 
business days in which to object to registration of the squatter as proprietor, and it is, 
generally, only if there are no objections that the squatter will registered with title to 
the land at this stage.
57
  
                                                 
53
 This distinction is a major theme in academic commentary and judicial reasoning in the USA – see, 
eg, R.H. Helmholz „Adverse possession and subjective intent‟ (1983) 61 Washington University Law 
Quarterly 331 – and underpins the law in many civil law jurisdictions.  
54
 See, for example, Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Waterloo Real Estate Inc [1999] 2 EGLR 85 at 87. 
55
 Section 97 of the LRA 2002 provides that a squatter may apply, to the Land Registry, to be 
registered as the proprietor of an estate in land in accordance with Schedule 6. 
56
 LRA 2002, Sched 6, para 2. 
57
 ibid para 3.   
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These provisions have been described as „the emasculation of adverse possession in 
relation to registered land‟,58 and as signalling „…the end of adverse possession as a 
threat to the security of registered title, save in cases where the registered proprietor 
genuinely has no use for the land (and does not wish to keep it).‟59  Where a 
landowner does object to the registration of the squatter as proprietor, there are two 
possible outcomes.  If the circumstances fall within one of the exceptions set out in 
Schedule 6, paragraph 5 – that is, that the squatter has an estoppel in his or her favour; 
that the squatter has some other entitlement to be registered (eg an estate contract, 
inheritance); or the dispute concerns a boundary; then the squatter can be registered as 
proprietor even though the landowner has objected.  On the other hand, if the 
squatter‟s application does not fall within one of these limited exceptions, and the 
registered proprietor does not take steps to physically remove the squatter (ie by 
issuing a writ for possession) within a further 2 years then the squatter can re-apply to 
the Land Registry, at which point the squatter will be entitled to be registered as 
proprietor.   
 
The reforms to the law of adverse possession in the LRA 2002 were primarily 
justified within the context of the Act as a whole, which sought to sharpen the system 
of registered land, to become  a system of title by registration (as opposed to 
registration of title).  However, the Law Commission papers that preceded the Act
60
 
also disclosed a strong moral stance on the immorality of squatting,
61
 which 
undoubtedly had a powerful impact on both the proposals themselves and the relative 
lack of opposition with which they have been met, both before and after enactment.
62
  
The language of the Law Commission‟s analysis clearly portrayed the squatter as 
being at fault - for example, in the Commission‟s observation that: „[i]t is, of course, 
remarkable that the law is prepared to legitimise such “possession of wrong” which, at 
                                                 
58
 Dixon (2003), above n 16. 
59
 ibid 151. 
60
 Law Commission, Land Registration for the 21st Century: A Consultative Document (Law Com No 
254), (London: HMSO, 1998). See also Law Commission, Land Registration for the 21st Century: A 
Conveyancing Revolution (Law Com No 271), (London: HMSO, 2001). 
61
 See Cobb & Fox, above n 2.  
62
 The present authors are happy to join Martin Dixon, who described himself as being: „(possibly in a 
minority of one) [in that he] regards the reform of the process of adverse possession by the 2002 Act as 
an unnecessary and economically unjustified “bolt on” to the reform of registered land‟; Dixon (2005) 
above n 16, 351.  See Dixon (2006), above n 16 for further criticism of the LRA 2002 reforms in 
relation to adverse possession.  
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least in some cases, is tantamount to sanctioning a theft of land.‟63  The landowner, on 
the other hand, was constructed as a blameless character, in need of protection from 
the Land Registry, even when he or she might arguably have been regarded as being 
„at fault‟ due to a failure to effectively scrutinise the land.  The explicit emphasis on 
the register as the driving force behind the reform of adverse possession in England 
and Wales also supported the Law Commission‟s approach to hardship in relation to 
the landowner, epitomised by the risk that a landowner could lose title to registered 
land, against the backdrop of the Land Registry‟s guarantee of title.64   
 
It is useful to map the exceptions to the erosion of adverse possession in the LRA 
2002 against the fault/hardship matrix.  The LRA 2002 identified three circumstances 
in which the squatter could be registered as proprietor on a ten-year application: 
where there is an estoppel in favour of the squatter; where the squatter has a beneficial 
entitlement to the property by some other means (eg an estate contract or by 
inheritance), and where the dispute concerns a boundary and both the claimant 
squatter and the landowner were mistaken as to the position of the boundary.
65
  When 
considering the identity of the squatter, the nature of the property, the squatter‟s 
motivation for trespass and the conduct of the landowner, it is possible to track how 
the fault/hardship balance shifts from the landowner to the squatter in each of these 
cases.  For example, when considering the squatter‟s motivation for trespass, it is 
significant to note that, in all three cases, these squatters are likely to have acted in 
good faith.   
 
Firstly, in relation to estoppel, a squatter who can establish an estoppel against the 
landowner has already shown both that the landowner‟s conduct adduces some 
element of fault (by making a representation or giving encouragement to the squatter 
concerning the ownership of the land), and that the squatter can be identified as not at 
                                                 
63
 Above n 60 (1998), [10.5].  It is interesting to note that the Law Commission‟s reform proposals 
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 LRA 2002, Schedule 6, para 5.  
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fault – since by analogy with equitable estoppel, the squatter who fits within this 
exception can be viewed as needing „clean hands‟.  Although the hardship of not 
having (use of) the land is potentially significant for both parties, the squatter appears 
to have a stronger claim to hardship in light of ten years or more of possession without 
fault, as well as the hardship argument based on preserving the status quo: that is, that 
the squatter is currently in occupation of the property.
66
   
 
Secondly, in relation to the squatter who has an entitlement by some other means, it is 
significant that, again, the squatter cannot be regarded as being „at fault‟, even though 
the failure to complete by registration may have been the squatter‟s omission, since 
his or her pre-existing beneficial entitlement means that, in substance, the lack of 
registered title can be viewed as a technicality.  Perhaps more significantly, the 
balance of hardship is particularly striking in this context: since the squatter‟s 
entitlement to the land amounts to an equitable interest which was acquired outside 
the context of the adverse possession, and the landowner‟s interest is more akin to the 
position of a trustee, the hardship to the squatter, should the Land Registry fail to 
recognise his or her claim would be much greater than any hardship to the registered 
title holder.   
A similar picture emerges in relation to boundary disputes – with the added 
implications of dealing with what are in reality likely to be very small amounts of 
land.  The „squatter‟ has acted in good faith – so without fault - under a mistaken 
belief as to the location of the boundary.  Similarly, the hardship to the landowner 
must be small, since, in order for the exception to apply, the registered proprietor 
must have shared this mistaken belief.    
 
LRA 2002 – GENERAL  Fault Hardship 
Squatter Squatter at fault 
(only „bad faith‟) 
Not relevant 
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 As David Hume once reasoned, „[m]en generally fix their affections more on what they are possess‟d 
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not to give it to him.‟ D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: being an attempt to Introduce the 
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (London: Allman, 1817), Book III, Part II, 
Section 1.    
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Landowner Landowner not at fault 
(unreasonable burden) 
Loss of title a major 
concern 
ESTOPPEL   
Squatter Squatter not at fault Potentially large – and is 
in occupation of the 
property 
Landowner Landowner at fault Potentially large hardship 
from loss of title to land 
OTHER (BENEFICIAL) 
ENTITLEMENT 
  
Squatter Squatter not at fault Potentially large as the 
squatter is in occupation 
and entitled to ownership 
in equity 
Landowner Landowner not at fault Little hardship as no 
equitable entitlement and 
not in occupation 
BOUNDARY DISPUTE Fault Hardship 
Squatter Squatter not at fault Hardship due to mistaken 
belief in rightful 
ownership  
Landowner Landowner not at fault Little hardship as 
landowner also mistaken  
Figure 4 – Land Registration Act 2002, general rule and exceptions 
 
Taken together, the general rule following the LRA 2002, and the three exceptions to 
this general rule, represent a new moral matrix underpinning the English law of 
adverse possession after the 2002 Act, along axes of fault and hardship.  However, 
enactment of the 2002 Act is by no means the end of the story so far as the 
construction and reconstruction of the taxonomy of adverse possession for English 
law is concerned.  In the next section, we analyse another important dimension of the 
new legal order of adverse possession in England by considering the relationship 
between this domestic taxonomy of the English law of adverse possession, and the 
recent high-profile litigation brought to the European Court of Human Rights by 
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English landowners, property development company J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd.  Spanning 
over seven years, the Pye litigation was considered by the Court of Appeal and House 
of Lords before reaching the European Court of Human Rights and was recently 
concluded, in favour of the UK government, with the judgment of the Grand Chamber 
of that court in August 2007.   
 
The Pye litigation has brought to the fore important issues concerning the way in 
which European human rights law engages with the doctrine of adverse possession, 
including, specifically the central importance attributed to the context of the new 
(domestic) legal order of adverse possession and registered land in England.  It has 
divided the European Court of Human Rights, reflected most clearly in that court‟s 
competing appraisals of the UK‟s own moral claims about the doctrine.  Furthermore, 
competing deployments of the principles and concepts of European jurisprudence, 
such as the margin of appreciation granted to member states, hint at the tensions 
between alternative approaches underpinning the majority and dissenting opinions in 
both the Chamber and Grand Chamber.  The analysis in the following section has two 
objectives.  First, while the outcome of the Grand Chamber decision resonates with 
the argument that the reforms set out in the LRA 2002 implemented a particular moral 
agenda, rather than following automatically and inevitably from sharpening of the 
system of registered land in the LRA 2002,
67
 we find the reasoning of the Grand 
Chamber unconvincing on its own terms.  Second, we draw attention to a parallel 
process of reasoning within the dissenting judgements which opens up the potential 
for a more convincing understanding of the moral dimensions of adverse possession, 
which is rooted in the owner‟s duty of stewardship in relation to her land. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND THE PYE LITIGATION  
 
A. Introducing the Pye litigation 
 
The facts of Pye v Graham are well-known: J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd is a large 
landholding company based outside Oxford, which in February 1983 entered into a 
written agreement with Mr and Mrs Graham, who were neighbouring farmers.  The 
agreement allowed the Grahams to use for grazing 25 hectares of registered land 
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 Which the present authors have also made elsewhere, see Cobb & Fox, above n 2. 
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belonging to the company that adjoined the Grahams‟ farmland.  However, after the 
agreement came to an end, the Grahams continued to use the land, and Pye made no 
further effort to prevent them from doing so.  In June 1997 the Grahams registered 
cautions at the Land Registry against the claimant‟s title to the land on the basis that 
they had obtained title by adverse possession.  The land was then estimated to be 
worth at least £2.5 million.
68
  At trial, the Grahams were found to be entitled to be 
registered as proprietors of the land.  However, on a series of appeals before the UK 
domestic courts (allowed by the Court of Appeal, reversed by the House of Lords) 
Pye claimed that the loss of its land under the pre-2003 system breached Article 1, 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention, which protects the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions, and that the UK Government should be required to compensate it for the 
resulting loss.  The case reached the European Court in November 2006 and, 
interestingly, the decision of the Court was not unanimous; indeed, quite the opposite.  
A majority of only four-to-three of the original Chamber agreed that there had been a 
breach of the Convention by the UK Government.  In response, the Government 
petitioned under Article 43 of the European Convention (reserved for exceptional 
circumstances) for the case to be brought before the Grand Chamber for a further 
hearing.  The judgment of the Grand Chamber was released in August 2007, and in 
this final, fascinating stage in the Pye litigation, the Grand Chamber, by a split 
decision (10 to 7), reversed the decision of the original Court, holding that there had, 
in fact, been no breach of Article 1, Protocol 1 (hereafter „P1-1‟). 
 
B. Positioning Pye within the squatting taxonomies 
 
In positioning the Pye litigation, it is useful to begin by noting two general points: 
firstly, the both chambers of the European Court were ultimately unconvinced by the 
argument levelled by the applicants that the doctrine of adverse possession, derived as 
it was from the principle of limitation, was limited to an argument under Article 6 of 
the European Convention, which safeguards the individual‟s right to due process.  The 
courts concluded instead that, while challenges relating to the Convention-compliance 
of limitation periods had been considered with respect to Article 6 in earlier European 
jurisprudence, this did not preclude consideration of such provisions under other 
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 Pye v UK (Application no. 44302/02), 30 August 2007, [23].  This is the value put forward by the 
Government, although Pye claimed their losses at over £10 million. 
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articles of the Convention. The chambers also both dismissed the claim of the 
applicants that P1-1 was not engaged because adverse possession constituted an 
incident of land ownership imposed at the moment of acquisition.  There was 
therefore no doubt among the judges of both courts that P1-1 was engaged by the 
issues raised in relation to adverse possession.   
 
Where the Chamber and Grand Chamber differed, however, was in their respective 
appraisals of the compatibility of the doctrine of adverse possession with the 
European Convention. The broad impact of P1-1 can be briefly stated, as comprising 
three distinct rules:
69
 the first rule states the principle of peaceful enjoyment of 
property; the second rule covers deprivation of possessions, and provides that 
deprivations can only occur subject to certain conditions; and the third rule recognises 
that states are entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest, by enforcing such laws as they might deem necessary for that purpose.  
Interference by a state with an individual‟s rights to property can be justified on the 
basis of the public or general interest.  In short: 
Measures which interfere with property rights must have a legitimate aim, and 
must be proportionate.  They must also strike a fair balance between the rights 
of the individual and the general interest of the community.
70
   
Indeed, it is now well-established that states are granted a wide margin of appreciation 
to take action interfering with an individual‟s rights under P1-1.  The European Court 
will accept a state‟s own judgment about what is in the public interest, and the 
appropriate balance struck in pursuit of that public interest, unless it is found to be 
„manifestly without reasonable foundation‟.71   
 
What follows is a brief appraisal of the judgments of both the Chamber and Grand 
Chamber of the European Court in the Pye litigation, in which we begin to consider 
the subtly different forms of legal reasoning deployed in the majority opinions in both 
the Chamber and Grand Chamber, and designed to position the dispute in Pye within 
particular (competing) taxonomies of squatting.  Before considering each of these 
competing taxonomies in detail, the following section presents three components of 
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the European jurisprudence around P1-1 which formed the foundation for this 
„taxonomical struggle‟. 
 
(1) European jurisprudence as the basis for moral taxonomies of squatting 
 
The majority in both the Chamber and Grand Chamber sought to derive support for 
their respective positions from the (moral) priorities of European jurisprudence.  In 
doing so, the courts were particularly keen to identify whether the doctrine of adverse 
possession was appropriately classified for the purpose of P1-1 as either a deprivation 
or control of use of property.  This legal distinction, it was claimed, was central to an 
appraisal of the legality of the doctrine because of its implications for the question of 
compensation for landowners affected by interference with the enjoyment of their 
possessions.  While a deprivation of property required the compensation of the 
landowner in all but „exceptional circumstances‟, they argued, the state was under no 
such requirement when merely controlling use.  Correctly identifying the nature of the 
doctrine of adverse possession according to this jurisprudential distinction was 
therefore integral to the courts‟ appraisal of the hardship legitimately experienced by 
landowners under P1-1. 
 
Our analysis also illustrates how the legal reasoning of the European Court was 
influenced, in part at least, by the UK Government‟s own powerful critique of the pre-
2003 system.  In particular, those judges opposed to the doctrine (both within the 
Chamber and Grand Chamber) deployed the wide margin of appreciation granted to 
individual states in relation to P1-1 to draw explicitly upon these domestic 
justifications when justifying the position of the European Court of Human Rights.  
Finally, the courts‟ moral taxonomies were influenced too by the specific facts of the 
Pye litigation.  As we have argued in earlier sections, adverse possession has different 
moral implications, in terms of fault and hardship, depending upon the circumstances 
in which it operates. For example, one may adjudge the transfer of land ownership 
under the doctrine more or less justifiable given the particular characteristics and 
conduct of landowner and squatter. The obvious question arising from this 
observation, of course, is the extent to which particular scenarios can, or should, be 
given weight over others by the European Court when assessing the legitimacy of the 
mechanism overall under P1-1.  
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Indeed, the extent to which the general appropriateness of a complex legal 
mechanism like the doctrine of adverse possession can legitimately be assessed based 
on the specificity of its operation in a particular context has concerned the European 
Court in previous cases.  The Court asserted in James v UK that its approach will vary 
depending upon the role of the state in the alleged infringement of P1-1.  Where the 
alleged infringement is the result of an executive act by a public authority, the court 
will focus its attention upon the specific facts of the case.  However, the approach 
changes when the state is challenged qua legislator, because the alleged infringement 
is the result of enforcement of that legislation by a private party.
72
  In such 
circumstances, while the case is brought as an individual grievance, it is the court‟s 
duty to consider the compatibility of the legislative framework as a whole, rather than 
the specific factual context giving rise to the application to the court.   
 
Nevertheless, in James v UK, the court went on to add that „this does not mean the 
Court will examine the legislation in abstracto.‟73  Instead, the particular experience of 
the applicant must be treated as „illustrative‟ of the impact of the legislation in 
practice „and, as such, material to the issue of compatibility with the Convention.‟74  
The question begged by this proviso, however, is exactly how a court is expected to 
strike an appropriate balance between an appraisal of the general acceptability of a 
legal rule and its specific (potentially severe) operation in a particular factual context.  
What the Pye litigation suggests, quite simply, is that both the Chamber and the Grand 
Chamber were able to manipulate the adjudicative discretion granted to them by this 
rule to move between the generality and specificity of the operation of the doctrine of 
adverse possession to reach the desired outcome.  Most importantly, as the following 
sections demonstrate, the specific facts of Pye appear to have had a considerable 
impact upon the Grand Chamber‟s appraisal of the doctrine of adverse possession as it 
applied in this case – to which the relevant law had been the pre-2003 provisions - 
particularly in relation to the issue of the landowner‟s fault. 
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(2) The Chamber judgment
75
 
 
The first judgment of the European Court was undoubtedly influenced by the changes 
to the domestic law of adverse possession in England and Wales introduced by the 
LRA 2002.  The court explicitly noted, when assessing whether the pre-2003 system 
struck a fair balance between the rights of a landowner and the public interest, that: 
„…in judging the proportionality of the system as applied in the present case, the 
Court attaches particular weight to the changes made in that system and to the view of 
the Law Commission and the Land Registry as to the lack of cogent reasons to justify 
the system of adverse possession as it applied in the case of registered land.‟76  
Accordingly, as illustrated below, for the original chamber the squatting taxonomy 
implicitly developed by the Law Commission (around the poles of fault and hardship) 
loomed large in its own appraisal of the pre-2003 system of adverse possession.  
 
For the minority judges, this starting-point proved extremely troubling: „[w]e fear that 
the majority may have been swayed by the legislative changes and judicial comments, 
rather than trying to assess what would have been the position if, for example, the 
2002 [Act] had not been passed.‟77  In truth, however, the court‟s reliance upon the 
Law Commission‟s construction of the doctrine is wholly understandable. Prior to the 
Commission‟s consultation paper there was a notable discursive vacuum with respect 
to adverse possession and registered land in English law.  When the Land Registration 
Act 1925 - which had governed issues of adverse possession in registered land before 
the LRA 2002 - was enacted, the objective so far as adverse possession was 
concerned was to replicate, so far as possible, the system of adverse possession as it 
operated in unregistered land.
78
  There was therefore little explicit rationalisation of 
the doctrine upon which the court could draw in seeking a cogent justification for the 
system of adverse possession within a system of registered land in the United 
Kingdom, other than the reform agenda which post-dated the provision under 
consideration, and which was dominated by the objective of achieving a more perfect 
system of title by registration.  Significantly, this reform agenda did not allow scope 
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for analysis of the philosophical and moral justifications that were thought to underpin 
the pre-2003 regime,
79
 for instance, the potentially powerful alternative rationalisation 
for such a system, in the enforcement of a landowner‟s duty of stewardship.80   
 
In the absence of any pre-2003 rationalisation for adverse possession in registered 
land, the Chamber could only look to the justifications proposed for the post-2003 
system to explain the existence of the doctrine of adverse possession in the context of 
registered land.
81
  Indeed, this epistemological limit upon the chamber‟s legal 
imagination promoted the Law Commission‟s approach as the only rational basis for a 
system of adverse possession in registered land.   
 
This moral discourse also dovetailed easily with contemporary P1-1 jurisprudence.  
The Chamber noted that European jurisprudence provided states with a wide margin 
of appreciation when seeking to secure economic, social or other policies, so that it 
was only if a particular public interest objective was „manifestly without reasonable 
foundation‟ that the State‟s interference with the applicant‟s right would amount to a 
breach of the Convention.
82
  The UK Government had attempted to set out two 
justifications for adverse possession before the Chamber: (1) the public interest in 
preventing the injustice and uncertainty arising from stale claims being brought 
against a squatter and (2) the public interest in ensuring that the unopposed 
occupation of land (as a physical fact) and its legal ownership coincided.  The 
Chamber rejected these objectives as irrational, deciding instead that „the 
uncertainties which sometimes arise in relation to the ownership of land are very 
unlikely to arise in the context of a system of land ownership involving compulsory 
registration, where the owner of the land is readily identifiable by inspecting 
proprietorship register of the relevant title at the Land Registry.‟83   
 
The Chamber did accept that since the LRA 2002 had not abolished the doctrine 
entirely, the UK Government had not completely abandoned adverse possession as a 
doctrine; rather, it was implicitly presumed that the „public interest‟ against which the 
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rights of the landowner were being measured was oriented around the goals set out in 
the LRA 2002 (rather than focusing on the goals of the LRA 1925).
84
  In practice, as 
the discussion above has indicated, the persistent public interest in an (albeit much 
constrained) ongoing role for adverse possession in English law after 2003 is rooted 
in a combination of the twin objectives identified by the Law Commission in the 
papers preceding the LRA 2002: economic efficiency and moral justice.
85
  
Nevertheless, the Chamber found in favour of Pye concluding that even on these 
criteria the balance struck by the pre-2003 legislative system was disproportionate.
86
  
 
In reaching its conclusion the Chamber used European jurisprudence to deploy a 
particular moral construction of the operation of the doctrine of adverse possession 
that placed the hardship experienced by the landowner at the heart of its adjudication. 
Undoubtedly, the most important issue identified by the Chamber was the loss of land 
by Pye without compensation, particularly in light of the lack of procedural 
protections in place under that system.
87
  Regardless of the responsibilities associated 
with land ownership, lack of compensation was key to its view that the pre-2003 
system did not strike a fair balance between the landowner‟s right and the public 
interest.
88
  Importantly, the Chamber concluded that the operation of the doctrine of 
adverse possession amounted to a deprivation (rather than control of use) of property.  
Since ECHR case law provides that a failure to compensate a deprivation of 
possessions will always render a legislative system disproportionate unless 
„exceptional circumstances‟ exist,89 this rule allowed the Chamber to reinforce the 
earlier concerns expressed by the House of Lords regarding the lack of compensation 
afforded under the pre-2003 system of adverse possession.
90
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Notable, too, was the court‟s explicit reference to another aspect of the moral 
taxonomy: the fault of the landowner.  The Chamber noted that the twelve year 
limitation period applied under the LRA 1925 allowed a relatively long window for a 
landowner to take action against a squatter.  It also emphasised that „in order to avoid 
losing their title [the applicants] would have had to do no more than regularise the 
Grahams‟ occupation of the land or issue proceedings to recover possession within the 
12-year period.‟91  The Grahams had written numerous letters over the years 
requesting a grazing licence but the company had failed to respond to this explicit 
notification of their presence on the land.  As the dissenting judges concluded in their 
opinion:  
the „real‟ fault in this case, if there had been any, lies with the applicant 
companies, rather than the Government.  It has to be borne in mind that the 
applicant company was not a private individual or an ordinary company with, 
one could assume, limited knowledge on relevant real-estate legislation.  They 
were specialised professional real-estate developers, and such a company had 
or should have had full knowledge about relevant legislation and the duties 
involved.
92
 
The Chamber‟s consideration of Pye‟s culpability highlights the significance of the 
individual circumstances of the applicant company for the Chamber‟s broad appraisal 
of the pre-2003 legislative regime.  As noted in the previous section, ECHR 
jurisprudence demands that the individual circumstances of an applicant should be 
treated as „illustrative‟ of the operation of the legislation.  By drawing upon the 
particular facts of the Pye litigation, both the majority and the minority opinions in the 
Chamber judgment render problematic the Law Commission‟s own discursive 
construction of the paradigmatic (predominantly large-scale) landowner as vulnerable 
to loss of title to squatters through no fault of their own.
93
   
 
However, in practical terms the identification of Pye‟s moral culpability failed to 
persuade the Chamber of the adequacy of the legislation.  It continued: „the question 
nevertheless remains whether, even having regard to the lack of care and inadvertence 
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on the part of the applicants and their advisers, the deprivation of their title to the 
registered land and the transfer of beneficial ownership to those in unauthorised 
possession struck a fair balance with any legitimate public interest served.‟94  
Specifically, the fault of landowner was deemed irrelevant, since any fault on the part 
of the landowner would be overshadowed by the hardship associated with a 
deprivation of property without compensation.  Whether or not the landowner was at 
fault, he or she could not deserve to lose property through adverse possession, 
particularly given the limited ongoing relevance of the pre-2003 system in achieving 
the public interest objectives of the post-2003 regime.  
 
(3) The approach of the Grand Chamber of the European Court
95
 
 
Thus, the absence of compensation, prioritised under European jurisprudence, allowed 
the Chamber to draw upon, and reinforce, the UK‟s own moral taxonomy of adverse 
possession, by emphasising the hardship faced by a landowner over and above all 
other consideration.  However, before the Grand Chamber, this decision was 
ultimately reversed.  Although we have been broadly critical of what we view as 
insufficient analysis in relation to the dismantling of the doctrine of adverse 
possession, we remain unconvinced by the reasoning applied by the Grand Chamber 
to revive the doctrine for the purposes of this case.  A potent issue for the Grand 
Chamber, focused as it was on the issue of compensation for the UK government, 
must have been the inevitable consequence that a finding in favour of Pye would 
potentially expose both the UK Government - and perhaps other Member States in 
due course - to liability for compensation.
96
  In direct opposition to the Chamber 
judgment, and supporting its dissenting judges, the Grand Chamber‟s judgment was 
coloured by its explicit efforts to distance its reasoning from the reforms implemented 
by the 2002 Act.
97
  However, this section argues (agreeing for the most part with the 
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dissenting judges in that case) that the Grand Chamber‟s reasoning is both illogical 
and at odds with European jurisprudence and, as such, provides an inadequate basis 
for a defence of the doctrine. 
 
At the very first stage of the court‟s appraisal of the pre-2003 regime, the Grand 
Chamber considered again the public interest underpinning the pre-2003 regime of 
adverse possession.  Like the Chamber before it, the Grand Chamber placed 
considerable emphasis on the margin of appreciation enjoyed by member states when 
assessing the „public interest‟, in the context of social and economic policies.98  
Moreover, it reasoned that: „…even where title to real property is registered, it must 
be open to the legislature to attach more weight to lengthy, unchallenged possession 
that to the formal fact of registration.‟99  As noted above, the Chamber implied that 
the only rational explanation for adverse possession could be that proposed by the 
Law Commission and underpinning the 2002 Act.
100
  Yet, the Grand Chamber seemed 
to go beyond this appraisal, by refocusing attention not upon the public policy 
exemptions to the LRA 2002‟s general restraint on adverse possession in registered 
land, but upon the traditional objectives of limitation periods per se.
101
  The Grand 
Chamber relied on the case of Stubbings v UK
102
 to argue that limitation periods were 
generally accepted by European jurisprudence as a legitimate aim of legislation, in 
pursuit of „legal certainty‟.103   
 
The Grand Chamber‟s reconstruction of the doctrine of adverse possession as merely 
a limitation mechanism has obvious consequences for its position within our 
taxonomies of squatting.  Indeed, we would suggest that the court was intent on „de-
moralising‟ the issue of adverse possession, in order to avoid finding a breach of P1-1.  
The prioritisation of the evidential objective of legal certainty rendered the 
„mechanism‟ of adverse possession a mere bureaucratic tool and, as such, downplayed 
its redistributive implications.  Where moral assessment did emerge in the court‟s 
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decision, it was carefully tailored to emphasise the specific fault of Pye and to gloss 
over both the hardship caused to the company and the Grahams‟ bad faith. As the 
court concluded, while Pye was able to easily seek possession of the land over the 
preceding 12 years:
104
 „in James [v UK], the possibility of “undeserving” tenants 
being able to make “windfall profits” did not affect the overall assessment of the 
proportionality of the legislation…and any windfall for the Grahams must be regarded 
in the same light in the present case.‟105  The Grand Chamber also exploited the 
distinction between deprivation and control of use to reinforce this moral 
construction. By reaching the conclusion that the operation of adverse possession as a 
limitation tool was a control of use, absence of compensation, so central to the 
Chamber‟s prioritisation of the hardship experienced by Pye, could be simply ignored. 
 
Thus, the Grand Chamber judgment drew upon a variety of jurisprudential techniques 
to reposition the doctrine of adverse possession within a less morally contentious 
framework than that found within both UK political discourse (and originally 
reinforced by the Chamber).  With hindsight, however, it remains evident that the pre-
2003 system of adverse possession cannot rationally be justified solely on grounds of 
evidential concerns regarding title in a system of registered land, nor can it be 
justified on grounds of overall predictability of title within the land system.  One 
might argue that the legal certainty that the Grand Chamber referred to was not 
evidential, but was an attempt to claim that limitation periods are justified by settling 
long possession in favour of a squatter.  Yet even this justification for limitation 
periods cannot be asserted in a system of registered title.   
 
Nevertheless, while the Grand Chamber‟s explanation of the public interest pursued 
by the pre-2003 system is indeed irrational in the context of the English system of 
registration, the following sections contend that a superior justification for the public 
interest element of P1-1 may be drawn from a taxonomy of squatting founded upon a 
landowner‟s duty of stewardship.  
 
ECtHR CHAMBER  Fault Hardship 
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Squatter Ostensibly irrelevant 
(Implicit blame?) 
Irrelevant 
 
Landowner Irrelevant Unjustified hardship 
(No compensation) 
GRAND CHAMBER Fault Hardship 
Squatter Ostensibly irrelevant 
(Implicit blame?) 
Irrelevant 
 
Landowner Blameworthy 
(Failure to act) 
Necessary hardship 
(Basis of limitation) 
Figure 5 – The Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments in Pye v UK 
 
JUSTIFYING ADVERSE POSSESSION: A DUTY OF STEWARDSHIP 
  
It is difficult to avoid the possibility that the Grand Chamber‟s judgement may have 
been influenced by an awareness of the broader context, including the prevalence of 
adverse possession provisions across many of the Member States,
106
 and the potential 
financial impact for these countries of any judgment which found that adverse 
possession operates in breach of P1-1.
107
  However, putting these issues aside, this 
section posits the reconstruction of a workable justification for adverse possession in 
registered land, within the theoretical frameworks of property law and European 
human rights jurisprudence.   
 
To start with, we note that the dissenting judges in the Grand Chamber expressed 
serious concerns that the majority: „had argued that it must be open to the legislature 
to attach more weight to lengthy, unchallenged possession than to the formal fact of 
registration.‟  Judge Lovcaides responded that: „I do not understand the logic of this 
approach and I certainly do not find it convincing.  I do not see how illegal possession 
can prevail over legitimate ownership (de facto v. de jure).‟108  There may, however, 
be an alterative basis on which possession could be viewed, legitimately, as taking 
precedence over ownership, through an application of the concept of a duty of 
stewardship in relation to land.  Indeed, as this section will demonstrate, this 
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possibility is hinted at in several of the Pye judgments, and also resonates with 
contemporary philosophical and policy analysis which seeks to foster productive use 
of land and the role of property law as potentially transformative in relation to social 
justice and citizenship.  We argue that this alternative justification, which presents the 
more convincing goal of ensuring effective stewardship of land by landowners, would 
have provided a better basis on which the Grand Chamber might have reached its 
conclusion that there was a „public interest‟ justification for the pre-2003 system of 
adverse possession of registered land in English law.   
 
Support for this alternative model can be identified, within the Pye judgments, in an 
interesting afterword to the dissenting opinion of Judge Louciades in the Grand 
Chamber judgment in Pye v UK.  The dissenting judge concluded his opinion by 
stating that:  
 
in simple terms this system of adverse possession looks as if it is intended to 
punish a registered lawful owner of land for not showing sufficient interest in 
his property and for not sufficiently pursuing a squatter, who as a result is 
rewarded by gaining title to the property.  And in this respect I fully endorse 
the statement of Mr Justice Neuberger when he said that the fact that an owner 
who had sat on his rights for 12 years should be deprived of the land was 
„illogical and disproportionate‟.109  
 
This stewardship argument could usefully be deployed as a justifiable objective of a 
doctrine of adverse possession, such as that set out in the pre-2003 system, which 
seeks to penalise and deter poor management of land.  Rather than constructing the 
landowner who allows adverse possession to take place as the victim of an unfair 
system that punishes mere „oversight‟ or „inadvertence‟, an alternative construction 
might view the landowner as negligent in discharging his or her duties of stewardship.   
 
Even without invoking the specific requirements of title by registration, it is evident 
that the contemporary English model for property rights analysis is strongly oriented 
around an assumption, in most cases, of the superior value of individual ownership 
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over community or social concepts.
110
  In „The Rhetoric of Realty‟, Gray and Gray 
have argued that: „[t]he rhetoric of modern land law…articulates a generalised 
impatience with any threat to the realisation of individualist visions of the good 
life…in today‟s deadly serious game of privatised accumulation and consumption.‟111  
Furthermore, as Gray and Gray note later in this essay, the emergence of moral 
arguments relating to „reciprocity‟ - the „community value‟ interest in land as a 
resource, and the risk that private land rights may be trumped by some over-arching 
community interest - creates obvious tensions with the individualist model, and as 
such has been constrained to situations in which compensation is available, or where 
land use regulation pursues the „common good‟ as part of the „environmental 
contract‟ between the state and the community.112 
 
The concept of the private landowner‟s duty of stewardship has not attracted a great 
deal of attention in English legal writing in recent years.  Indeed, beyond the 
obligations not to commit wrongs against others in our use of land and to comply with 
environmental and planning regulation, the proposition that ownership of land carries 
duties in relation to the owner‟s use of their own land – for example, to be a good 
steward of the land – is not a feature of English legal culture.  This is in contrast to the 
value attributed to stewardship in respect of land in some other legal cultures.  For 
example, one can see how the Islamic property rights framework, which „…conceives 
of land as a sacred trust but promotes individual ownership with a re-distributive 
ethos‟113 supports a duty of stewardship on the basis that „[p]roperty and land vest in 
God, but are temporarily enjoyed by men and women through responsibility or 
trust…conditional on the requirement that property not be used wastefully…‟114  This 
perspective is also supported by the concept of property rights in Islamic economics, 
which „has implications far beyond the material domain as it lays stress on 
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responsibility, poverty alleviation and redistribution‟,115 and seeks to work from „a 
holistic, authentic, moral, ethical and legal land rights code‟.116  The relevance of this 
approach to squatters and unsupervised land is most clearly illustrated by the Islamic 
concept of mewat or „dead land‟, which allowed individuals to claim for their own use 
land that is empty and uncultivated or undeveloped.
117
  
 
Analyses of the role of land tenure systems in promoting sustainability, economic 
development and social inclusion, for example, in the projects carried out by UN-
HABITAT, have also highlighted the promotion of productive land use and 
stewardship as core values: 
  
Better land access and more secure land rights encourage investment in the 
land and respect for the environment.  This mitigates competition for, and 
pressure on, land and natural resources, while also maintaining productivity.  
Land rights also entail a duty of efficient and productive use.
118
   
 
While the case of farmland in Oxfordshire may seem a world away from the 
developing societies with which UN-HABITAT are primarily concerned, or the 
Shari’a law communities of the Islamic world, these discussions of the duty of 
stewardship over land as a natural resource provide an interesting foil to the English 
approach, which is explicitly predicated upon taking all necessary steps to protect the 
paper title holder who does not use – and, more importantly, does not exercise 
stewardship over – his or her land.   
 
Periods of transformation provide valuable opportunities for reflection on the values 
which inform our laws and policies,
119
 and the new legal order of adverse possession, 
after LRA 2002 and the commencement of the HRA 1998, provides a basis for critical 
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reflection on the values that underpin land laws and policies in England and Wales.  
In addition, notwithstanding the overall ethos of the prevailing approach, it is possible 
to detect threads of a stewardship analysis in the Pye litigation.  In order to locate this 
thread, it is also important to distinguish the idea of a duty of stewardship from 
discussions of the decision to develop the land (or not).  J.A Pye (Oxford) Ltd had 
plans to develop the disputed land in the future, but also had what we must assume to 
have been commercially valid reasons to leave the land vacant until such time as they 
wished to carry out the development.  The issue of land use and economic 
development was raised in Pye by the Irish Government, in its submissions to the 
Grand Chamber, that adverse possession could be justified „…in pursuance of a 
policy of using land to advance economic development.‟120  Of course, in a land 
economy where delay followed by future development may be the most appropriate 
economic use of land for the owner, the idea of attributing fault to landowners who 
fail to make effective economic use of their land, such that it is considered reasonable 
to divest them of their title in favour of a squatter, is not straightforward.  In some 
circumstances a landowner who leaves property undeveloped may not necessarily 
have failed to make economic use of the land, as to retain the land for future 
development or use, for example, when market conditions are more favourable, may 
be viewed as the most economically efficient use of that particular land at that 
particular time.   
 
This theme was also picked up by the dissenting judges to the Grand Chamber, who 
commented on the „economic development‟ analysis, that:  
 
The argument was also put forward that another possible legitimate aim of 
such an institution [adverse possession] would be to encourage landowners to 
exploit, improve, or make use of their land.  I cannot find this acceptable, first 
of all because such encouragement may be achieved by other less onerous 
means such as taxation, or the creation of incentives, and secondly I cannot 
accept that the general interest connected with that aim can reasonably extend 
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to depriving a registered landowner of his beneficial title to the land except by 
a proper process of compulsory acquisition for fair compensation.
121
 
 
It is interesting to consider this suggestion against the discussion above, which 
considered the arguments surrounding squatters and the empty homes debate in the 
UK: applying the proposition that unused land (in the form of empty homes) should 
be brought back into use, it is important that any system directed at encouraging more 
economic use of land should – rather than permitting the „who dares wins‟ of 
squatting - proceed on a principled, bureaucratic basis, giving due consideration to the 
question of compensation for the landowner who may have no use for the land, but 
does not wish to be divested of its exchange or capital value.   
 
Attempts, in the course of the ECHR stage of the Pye litigation, to defend the pre-
2003 doctrine of adverse possession on grounds of the prioritisation of economic 
development, were, for good reason, not successful.  We would argue, however, that 
the economic development argument does not adequately capture the duty of 
stewardship as we would conceptualise it in relation to land.  Rather, we would 
contend that an appropriate duty of stewardship is founded, not on an obligation to 
develop land, but in an obligation to ensure effective oversight of that land. At the 
heart of the dissenting judges‟ opinion in the Grand Chamber judgment is the 
proposition that: 
 
Possession (ownership) carries not only rights but also and always some duties.  
The purpose of the relevant legislation was to behove a landowner to be vigilant 
to protect the possession and not to „sleep on his or her rights‟.  The duty in this 
particular case – to do no more than begin an action for repossession within 12 
years – cannot be regarded as excessive or unreasonable.122 
 
It is this requirement of „vigilance‟ that crystallises the „stewardship‟ perspective on 
adverse possession, and which – rather than emphasising the unfairness of the regime 
for landowners – re-imagines the law of adverse possession as a regulatory system 
which enforces a duty of stewardship upon landowners.  There is a persuasive 
                                                 
121
 Dissenting opinion of Judge Lovcaides joined by Judge Koslo. 
122
 Pye v UK, Grand Chamber judgment, dissent, [0]-[12].   
 41 
argument to be made, that, in fact, stewardship rather than efficient land use provides 
the most cogent objective of a doctrine of adverse possession in a system of registered 
land.  All landowners can be regarded as owing a duty of stewardship in relation to 
their land, even if they do not wish to make use of that land at the present time.
123
  
What is particularly interesting about this conceptualisation of the duty of stewardship 
argument is that it inverts the Law Commission‟s own implicit squatting taxonomy: 
no longer is the focus upon the fault of the squatter and the hardship on the 
landowner; instead, it is the fault of the landowner in failing to oversee his or her land 
that forms the new core of the doctrine.  
 
In relation specifically to the fault of the squatter, it is noteworthy that the final 
dissenting judgment of the Grand Chamber in Pye v UK focused on the consequential 
significance of a system like adverse possession, which may be perceived as: 
„encourag[ing] illegal possession of property and the growth of squatting.‟124  Even if 
landowners are viewed as negligent (and thus „at fault‟), is it implied that this still 
does not justify the transfer of their titles to bad faith squatters?  Working within the 
taxonomy of squatting set out in this article, there may still be some valid arguments 
to consider in relation to this question.  For example, it could be argued that the bad 
faith squatter obtains a superior right to the property because the landowner‟s failure 
of stewardship (fault) renders the hardship of loss of land by the squatter after twelve 
years sufficient to warrant transfer of title: that is, that the landowner‟s fault justifies 
protecting the squatter from this hardship.  Another way of looking at this question 
might be to shift our perspective in relation to the fault of the squatter.  The Grand 
Chamber judgment was striking in its silence on the issue of the squatter‟s moral 
conduct, and while this may have been merely a reflection of the fact that the squatter 
was, at the European level, no longer a party to the action it is also interesting to 
consider whether the limited „presence‟ of the squatter as an actor in this dispute was 
limited to the idea that (in the context of limitation principles) the squatter would 
function as a (morally neutral) regulatory mechanism, encouraging due diligence in 
the management of land ownership.  By sidestepping the moral debate, and thereby 
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avoiding the distinction between good faith and bad faith squatters, this approach has 
the potential to fundamentally reconfigure the value judgments that shape the 
mapping of squatters within our taxonomies of squatting.   
 
STEWARDSHIP Fault Hardship 
Squatter Irrelevant 
(Regulatory mechanism?) 
Irrelevant 
 
Landowner Blameworthy 
(Failed stewardship) 
Justified hardship 
(Loss as deterrent) 
Figure 6 – A stewardship approach to the squatting taxonomy 
 
WOULD A DUTY OF STEWARDSHIP SATISFY ARTICLE 1, FIRST 
PROTOCOL OF THE ECHR? 
 
This article has proposed a re-analysis of the pre-2003 system of adverse possession 
that, it is argued, provides a much-needed rational underpinning to this much-
maligned doctrine. In this final section, we seek to illustrate how such a reappraisal of 
the doctrine would have also allowed the Grand Chamber of the European Court to 
provide a more logical justification for the doctrine in the context of Article 1 of the 
First Protocol to the Convention.   
 
Accepting the Grand Chamber‟s claim that it is open to a legislature to pursue the 
public interest by placing greater weight upon factual (albeit unauthorised) possession 
than registered title, this is also supported by the Law Commission for England and 
Wales, in its continued support for adverse possession, in exceptional cases, on the 
grounds of economic efficiency and moral justice.  However, it is also argued that 
invoking a duty of stewardship as the justification of the pre-2003 system of adverse 
possession in unregistered land makes considerably more sense than the Grand 
Chamber‟s unconvincing reliance upon traditional theories of limitation.  The 
stewardship justification facilitates an analysis that moves away entirely from the idea 
of adverse possession as a way to secure greater legal certainty, which has been 
correctly identified by both the Law Commission and the original chamber of the 
European Court as a weak justification in a system of registered land.  Whereas the 
fault of the landowner merely supported the objective of limitation periods in 
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unregistered land, under the stewardship model it can be viewed as a core justification 
for the doctrine, allowing it to be applied in both registered and unregistered land 
systems.  More importantly, a duty of stewardship can be applied to explain the pre-
2003 doctrine of adverse possession in its entirety, not simply its operation in those 
cases fitting the exceptions to the 2002 Act. 
 
When it comes to considering the second stage of a P1-1 appraisal: the extent to 
which the imposition of a duty of stewardship strikes a fair and proportionate balance 
between a landowner‟s rights and the public interest objective under Article 1, 
Protocol 1 of the Convention; one problematic issue remains, since the outcome of a 
successful adverse possession claim could still include the transfer of title from 
landowner to squatter without compensation.  For the Chamber, European 
jurisprudence could not entertain such hardship even where it could be said that the 
landowner was at fault for failing to evict a squatter from his or her property within 
twelve years.  However, the Grand Chamber‟s approach to the issue of proportionality 
provides an alternative ground on which to support such an analysis. 
 
The Chamber‟s assessment of the pre-2003 regime was predicated on an assessment 
of the doctrine as a deprivation of possessions under the second rule of P1-1.  In doing 
so, it drew on the similar facts of James v UK, involving legislation regulating the 
relationship between private actors and resulting ultimately in transfer of title from 
one party to the other.  However, in its own consideration of the proportionality of the 
pre-2003 regime, the Grand Chamber effectively circumvented this issue of 
compensation by characterising the operation of adverse possession under the LRA 
1925 as a „control of use‟ rather than a „deprivation of property‟.  This was achieved 
by claiming that the legislation was:  
 
…not intended to deprive paper owners of their ownership, but rather to 
regulate questions of title in a system in which, historically, 12 years‟ adverse 
possession was sufficient to extinguish the former right to re-enter or to 
recover possession, and the new title depended on the principle that 
unchallenged lengthy possession gave title.
125
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The Grand Chamber then proceeded on the basis that where title is extinguished as 
part of a control of use, the strict rules relating to compensation for deprivation of 
property no longer apply.  Accordingly, „exceptional circumstances‟ were not 
required to justify the lack of compensation in this case.  The Grand Chamber 
concluded that limitation periods depended for their operation upon a lack of 
compensation. 
 
One potential hurdle in applying this analysis, however, might be that the Grand 
Chamber distinguished James v UK by emphasising that the public interest in 
enforcing limitation periods did not pursue a social policy of transfer of land 
ownership which was clearly founded upon an intention to deprive the paper owners 
of title.  Yet, the distinction currently drawn in European jurisprudence between a 
„deprivation‟ and „control of use‟ is oblique at best, and it is arguable that, in line with 
the argument accepted in James v UK, in the context of adverse possession there is no 
intention on the part of legislators pursuing a duty of stewardship to deprive 
landowners of their property, but merely a desire to control their use of the land 
through the deterrent effect of the hardship of such loss, and so encourage landowners 
to maintain effective scrutiny and stewardship over their unused property.  
 
A final issue to confront might be the degree to which a truly blameless landowner 
might still fail to identify a squatter on his or her land for the full twelve years.  This 
was clearly of great concern to the Law Commission when it designed its proposals, 
claiming that under the law as it then stood, land could be lost to a squatter under the 
doctrine even where the landowner had taken reasonable steps to keep the land under 
effective scrutiny, specifically because squatters may not be readily identifiable, 
particularly because they keep a low profile.  In the latest edition of Gray & Gray‟s 
Elements of Land Law, the authors claim that „the possession which founds a claim 
for adverse possession must be open, notorious and unconcealed. It must be such that 
it would be noticed by a documentary owner “reasonable careful of his own 
interests”‟.126  This common law rule seems to provide a convincing protection for 
diligent landowners against „undiscoverable‟ squatters.  Only those, like Pye for 
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instance, who failed to engage in such a reasonable scrutiny of his or her property 
over twelve years would be at risk from the operation of the doctrine.  It is interesting 
to note that the authority that Gray and Gray claim for this final rule is an Australian 
case, Re Riley and the Real Property Act.
127
  If, as the Law Commission appears to 
assume, this principle is not in fact present in the modern English common law of 
adverse possession, then the development of a stewardship approach to adverse 
possession could usefully incorporate such a rule.  Otherwise, the risk of „anomalous‟ 
outcomes in the operation of the doctrine – that is, where a blameless landowner who 
has in fact satisfied the duty of stewardship still loses his land - could be said to 
render the overall system disproportionate under P1-1.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The object of this analysis has been to reconsider the raft of recent developments in 
the law of adverse possession by devising a formal taxonomy employing matrices of 
“fault” and “hardship”.  This type of taxonomic activity, we feel, has much to offer 
for scholars who wish to better understand „the purposes and principles that animate 
legal decision making‟ and, specifically, to consider the real values and issues at 
stake, although not always explicitly, in legal discourses around unlawful occupation.  
The taxonomy set out in this article, derived from discourses of unlawful occupation 
in a range of legal contexts, also provides a useful lens through which to analyse the 
decisions of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Pye litigation.  While it is argued that, ultimately, the Grand Chamber 
decision is problematic in its attempt to justify the pre-2003 system of adverse 
possession on traditional grounds of limitation, the outcome of the Grand Chamber‟s 
decision can be more appropriately re-imagined by refocusing attention upon the fault 
of the landowner - rather than fault of the squatter and the hardship to the landowner, 
as the contemporary discourse appears to demands - through a new discourse of land 
stewardship. 
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